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Historians tend to agree that the first half of the nineteenth century escaped the terrible 
subsistence crises which, during the ancien régime, made life a precarious business for a 
considerable number of the very poor.  Even though epidemics were also a threat, it is subsistence 
crises which were invoked, in a malthusian conception of the history of the ancien régime, as 
regulators of the level of population.  It was as if inevitably, space abhorring a vacuum, population 
ineluctably pressed against a subsistence ceiling. Crises then erupted, causing population to retreat.  
Gradually, undoubtedly due to several factors, these famines became scarcities, though this is not to 
say that they were no longer responsible for mortality peaks.  It was during the first half of the 
nineteenth century that the last of these crises occurred.  In this view, the crisis of 1846 marked the 
final apparition of this kind of mortality.  
But what is a crisis ? Being unable to count the number of deaths due to disease, as became 
feasible during the nineteenth century, historians have measured the effects of malnutrition or 
famine with the aid of a single measure, price: and perhaps they have relied too much on this 
measure. For price to give us a good picture of a crisis, there must be a strong correlation between 
harvests and prices on the one hand, and between harvests and mortality crises on the other.  This 
way of proceeding has given rise to controversy, but controversy which has been productive for 
French historiography.  Guided by Guy Cabourdin’s excellent survey, we offer a quick summary of 
the issues in order to place the crisis of 1846 in context.
1 
It all began with contemporaries such as L. Messance, who on the basis of annual data from 
Paris, Rouen, Lyon, Clermont-Ferrand, and, London, posited a positive correlation between wheat 
prices and mortality.
2 Using Messance’s data, Dr. François Melier posited an even tighter 
correlation between the two time series, writing in 1841: ‘whenever the price of wheat rose, 
mortality increased …and whenever it fell, mortality also fell..’  A little later, A. Legoyt, again on 
the basis of Messance’s data, stated: ‘Under the influence of (high prices), one sees mortality rising, 
marriages diminishing or becoming less fertile, and movements of population taking place’. 
It is this tradition which has influenced historical demographers, and particularly, Jean 
Meuvret, whose name is so closely linked to subsistence crises.
3  As Cabourdin puts it, ‘the 
correlation between exceptional rises in cereal prices, significant increases in deaths, and a falling 
off in conceptions to him seemed self-evident.’  It is within this framework that ‘modernist’ French 
historians worked at first.  First, Pierre Goubert, according to whom, ‘the economic crisis of the 
traditional type gave rise to a demographic crisis of the traditional type’; then the historical 
demographers Louis Henry and Etienne Gautier, as well as G. Livet, for whom ‘la mercuriale 
sécrète la mortalité (the mercuriale secretes mortality)’.  
Disagreement was not long in coming, and it came first from R. Baehrel, in his thesis on  
Basse-Provence.  For Baehrel, correlation did not imply causality : high prices and high mortality 
might well coincide, but both could be driven or influenced by a third factor, the weather.  A period 
of bad weather responsible for a particularly bad harvest was also bound to drive up mortality. 
Pierre Chaunu went further, claiming: ‘There are subsistence crises that don’t kill, and 
demographic crises in times of abundance; even when high prices and high mortality coincide, it is 
not a question of simple cause and effect…It is not hunger in the literal sense that kills, but the 
fellow-travellers of hunger...It is disease that kills, epidemics to which the those at risk are more 
vulnerable.. The subsistence crisis ceased to be the bread and butter of the demography of the 
ancien régime’.  Moreover, during crises death did not come through ‘literal starvation, but by the 
                                                 
1 Guy Cabourdin, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une crise ?’, in Jacques Dupâquier (ed.), Histoire de la population française. Vol. 2. 
De la renaissance à 1789. Paris, 1988, pp. 175-191. 
2  Messance, Recherches sur la population, especially pp. 291-2, 309-30. 
3 Jean Meuvret, ‘Les crises de subsistances et la démographie de la France d'Ancien régime’, Population, 1946, n° 4, 
Reprinted in id. Etudes d'histoire économique, Paris, 1971, pp. 271-278.  3 
epidemic route’.
4  Now, it does not seem to us (although the issue requires further investigation), 
that Jean Meuvret believed, through induction, that all the excess mortality he encountered was the 
product of subsistence crises. After all, he warned us that  ‘a poor harvest entails a rise in burials, 
but the excess deaths could be due to either hunger or epidemic diseases’.
5 The ensuing debate 
ignored this point and, certainly, the critique is off the mark when it seeks to minimize the role of 
poor harvests on mortality.  However, aside from these subsistence crises, it is still true, as with 
SARS or AIDS today, that not all crises are due to harvest shortfalls.  Cholera and plague offer 
good examples. 
If as Cabourdin argues, ‘not all price peaks resulted in significant excess mortality, nor can 
all mortality be inferred from movements in the price of grain’, the link between harvest and price 
implied in the earlier literature is probably too strong. Surely one can envisage harvest fluctuations 
that are not mechanically reflected in price movements? Effects resulting from human subjectivity, 
such as rumours for example, can they not impact on markets, exacerbating the effect of a poor 
harvest? Could it be otherwise in a world where trade grows and information were still imperfect ? 
In such a scenario, one may easily imagine that price increases did not always lead to a rise in 
deaths. 
There remains a tricky problem, that of how to measure crises, which influences in part the 
characteristics we attribute to them.  For Goubert, one can ‘speak of a demographic crisis from the 
moment that the annual number of deaths doubles and when, at the same time, the number of 
conceptions falls in an indisputable manner, by at least one-third’ – this relative to the average in 
normal years.  Since then several authors – T. H. Hollingsworth, Jacques Dûpaquier, Jean-Michel 
Chevet – have proposed methods that, in the quest of greater rigour, nevertheless also contain an 
arbitrary element like Goubert’s. 
One can see that in this context it was still possible to think that subsistence crises could still 
attack populations in the early part of the nineteenth century.  Thus Marcel Reinhard et A. 
Armengaud could write: ‘Economic crises are above all subsistence crises.  They still produce 
brutal drops in births – notably in 1817, 1832, and 1847 – accompanied or followed by epidemics 
and a rise in mortality – 1832, 1834, 1847, and 1849 ‘, and again ‘France remains very close in the 
demographic sense to where it was in the second half of the eighteenth century’.
6 This conception 
is is also evident in the claim of Labrousse relative to the the first half of the nineteenth century that  
‘..subsistence crises continue to hit the agricultural economy..At the level of the region or province, 
there are years of extreme penury : in 1817, 1832, 1839-40, 1846-47, 1854-56, 1867-68, to cite 
only some well known cases.
7 
However, André Armengaud introduces a discordant note in this concert when he writes a 
little later: ‘One can say that their impact lasted until the Second Empire, but in a much attenuated 
form: famines had disappeared from France since the beginning of the eighteenth century, only 
scarcities occurred now, and one did not die of starvation in the literal, physiological sense of the 
term any more.  True, in a period of scarcity, malnutrition of large sections of the population could 
provoke an aggravation of their sanitary state and increase the death rates of children, the elderly, 
and the sickly.  It is no less true that the years of major epidemics, at least at the national level, 
resulted in higher mortality than years of alimentary crisis.’
8 With the impact of food deficits thus 
lessened, the primary role is left to epidemics, so much so that in the early nineteenth century, in 
                                                 
4 On these citations see Cabourdin, ibid., pp. 178-180. 
5 Chevet, ‘Les crises démographiques en France’, p. 133. 
6 Reinhard  and Armengaud, Histoire générale de la population mondiale, p. 242. 
7 E. Labrousse, ‘A livre ouvert sur les élans et les vicissitudes des croissances’, in Braudel and Labrousse, Histoire 
économique et sociale de la France, vol. 3(2), p. 994. 
8 A. Armengaud, ‘Le rôle de la démographie’, in Braudel and Labrousse, Histoire économique et sociale de la France, 
vol. 3(1), pp. 202 et 244.  4 
the words of G. Caudelier, ‘the price of grain no longer had an decisive influence on morality’: the 
mercuriale no longer secreted mortality. 
For others, in the typology they give to crises in the 1800-1870 period, that of 1847-49 is 
deemed ‘very serious’ and should be placed in the context of ‘the poor harvest of 1846, the 
economic crisis of 1847-48, and above all the new cholera epidemic’.  But here too the cholera 
seems to dominate: ‘It will be noted that nearly all the mortality had an epidemic origin: 
subsistence crises – in particular that of 1846-49 – might be an aggravating factor..’
9 
Against the background of the state-of-play just outlined, we propose to re-evaluate the 
nature of demographic crises in the first half of the nineteenth century : distinguishing those which 
are of purely epidemic origin and those, if they exist, which deserve to be called subsistence crises.  
For reasons just cited, we will focus in particular on the crisis of 1847, which seems to historians to 
be the only one to qualify under this rubric.  That will lead us to an analysis in this period of the 
impact of variations in the food supply on the price of corn.   
In Part I demographic variables – mortality, natality, nuptiality, population – are analysed 
with a view to identifying crises and their intensity in the 1820-1870 period.  The crises that stand 
out will be confronted with price and production data. Account will also be taken of imports as a 
regulator of crisis.  This analysis will be conducted at the national level.  In Part II each element in 
the analysis will be re-focused on the regional or departemental level, which will allow us to judge 
the role which substitutes for wheat production might play. 
 
 
I – Crises at the national level. 
A – The timing and extent of demographic crises in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. 
If we examine the graph of deaths over the 1800-68 period in Figure I, we see that it is 
marked by a tendency to rise, which reflects the rise in French population.  Moreover, we also note 
various oscillations, as well as a number of peaks representing various crises.  In order to measure 
the amplitude of the most important crises, we have traced on the same graph a nin-year moving 
average.  If we deem, admittedly rather arbitrarily, devations of 10 per cent relative to the moving 
average as characterising a crisis, then apart from the 1820s, the years that stand out are 1832, 
1834, 1849, 1854, 1859, or five crises in 49 years.  That of 1847, with a deviation of only 4 per 
cent, does not figure on the list.  Indeed it is placed only eighth when one takes account of two 
peaks of 5 per cent, those in 1826 and in 1837. If one focuses on the post-imperial era, one sees, 
following A. Armengaud, that the cholera epidemics of 1832, 1834, 1849, and 1854, are far more 
murderous than the crisis of 1847 because in those years excess mortality levels of 12, 10, 18, and 
17 per cent were registered.  The crisis of 1847 pales by comparsion, son much so, that its existence 
is placed in doubt.
10 
This doubt persists and, indeed, increases, when the intensity of the crisis of 1847 is 
compared with those of the eighteenth century.
11  In effect, quite apart from the famine of 1693 and 
1694 when mortality rose by 34 and 60 per cent respectively, or that of 1709 and 1710 when the 
rises were 22 and 29.5 per cent, there were mortality surges of 25 per cent in 1719, 21.5 percent in 
                                                 
9 A. Bideau et al., ‘La mortalité de 1800 à 1914’, in J. Dupâquier, Histoire de la population française, vol. 3, De 1789 à 
1914, Paris,1988, p. 293. 
10 Armengaud, ibid.  See too Bourdelais and Raulot, Une peur bleue.  
11 One might object that working with harvest years minimises the gravity of the crisis of  1847. That might be the case 
if one found a rise in deaths in 1846. That not being the case, taking account of the last six months of 1846 cannot 
augment the crisis of 1847.  5 
1747, and 23 per cent in 1779.
12  If we apply the measure of moving averages to the same data, 
crises become more numerous.  Seven out of 51 years experience deviations of more than 10 per 
cent in deaths, and 11 exceed 5 per cent.  Not all of these crises were subsistence crises, of course, 
but the point is that when they were – their size dwarfed that of 1847 : 21.5 to 27.4 per cent in 
1747, depending on the denominator used, 12.3 per cent in 1772.  It would seem that over the long 
century between 1740 and 1850, there was a change, and scarcities became considerably milder or, 
indeed, disappeared.   
As in the case of deaths, a tendency for the number of births to rise over time is apparent 
from Figure I. However, the kind of ‘cycle’ that one sees here are much less marked and longer 
than those visible for deaths.  One also detects in the curve a certain number of falls in births which 
at first sight are linked to crises. The most severe of these, amounting to just under six per cent, was 
in 1847, which offers support to partisans of a subsistence crisis.  The other deficits are much less 
serious. We note those of 1831 (-4 per cent) and 1855 (-5 per cent); the rest are lower.  Moreover, 
none of the declines in the number of births coincides with a significant rise in the number of 
deaths. 
In times of crisis, the drop in the birth rate has a two-fold explanation. The first, mechanical, 
explanation is due to the mortality of mothers-to-be. If such is the case, the deficit in births occurs 
in the same year as the rise in deaths. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie has proposed a second 
explanation.
13  According to him, privation increases the sterility of some couples.  In this case, the 
decline in births would occur with a lag after the rise in deaths.  It is true that the disappearance of  
a husband or a wife could produce a similar outcome.  With the help of the annual data available, it 
is difficult to decide between the two hypotheses.  We note however that the demographic crisis is 
supposed to have followed the poor harvest of 1846, is not followed in 1848 by a significant 
decline in births.  The same holds for the other crises occurring in this period. 
                                                 
12 Chevet, ibid., p. 130 ; Lachiver, Années de misère. 
13 Roy Ladurie, ‘L'aménorrhée de famine’. 
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At this stage of the analysis, one must conclude that the crises of the nineteenth century 
were far from the conditions defined by Goubert and Meuvret to qualify as subsistence crises.  This 
observation places on the side of those historians who claim that the vigour of these crisis had 
attenuated compared to the early eighteenth century.  We would go a little further, however, and 
argue that in the nineteenth century they did not resemble either those of the second half of hte 
eighteenth century, to the extent that they had attenuated so much that they had disappeared.  This 
is what we are about to show.  
The examination of movements in the number of marriages yields little of interest in this 
context.
14 In effect, from 1825 on there was a modest rise in the number which tapered off c. 1845 
and accelerated slightly c. 1855.  There were few significant breaks.  The most important, a decline 
of 11 per cent, was in 1847. Perhaps this had more to do with the industrial crisis of 1847 than with 
subsistence.  The other declines, of under 7 per cent in 1832 and under 6 per cent in 1854, were due 




An examination of the evolution of French population during the nineteenth century suggests that it 
grew at a more or less regular pace.  The crisis of 1847 is visible only as a slowing down in the 
growth of population, which is no surprise since  there was no excess of deaths over births in that 
year.  On the other hand, that due to the cholera epidemic of mid-century is more visible.  It is for 
this crisis only that the number of deaths exceeded the number of births in 1859 and 1860.  The 
population curve, referring to a constant geographic territory, shows that the effects of the war of 
1870 were much more important and that it is on this occasion that one witnesses a rupture in the 
trend. 
A comparison of this curve with that of the reconstituted French population of the 
eighteenth century reveals essential differences, the most important being that the latter contains 
several ruptures, the most important being those associated with famines in 1693-94 and 1709-10. 
Later crises, though less intense, are nevertheless visible.  Thus there were breaks in 1719, 1740, 
                                                 
14 For this reason we omit the graphics. 
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1747, and 1779.  Here again, it seems to us that the first half of the nineteenth century differs from 




B – Demographic crises, prices and harvests.  
Most of the time, historians of the ancien regime have to do without data on harvests ; they 
rely on price movements as reflections of movements in output, a big rise in prices being taken to 
correspond to a deficit, more or less proportionate, in output.  To begin with, and because for the 
nineteenth century we are less destitute than contemporary historians as far as harvest data are 
concerned, it is prices that we first confront the crises identified above.  We will pay particular 
attention to the price of corn.  We focus on this because cereals – corn, meslin, rye – account for 
the bulk of production in this era. In the north of France, their cultivation represents nearly 95 per 
cent of the land surface devoted to human food  ; among them corn is most important with a 
proportion over 66 per cent.
15  In other regions, except for the Southwest where they account for 
only 70 per cent, cereals cover 75 to 90 per cent of land producting human food, corn’s share being 
between 60 and 70 per cent.  It reached only 40.5 per cent in the Centre and 53 per cent in the 
South.  If instead of analysing the area under cereal cultivation, one turns to their share in 
consumption, the landscape is modified due to high potato yields.  In the North the share of cereal 
is reduced to about 71per cent, and in the Southwest to 60.6 per cent.  Three other regions, West, 
Centre, and South, with a consumption between 50 and 60 per cent, are next, and the the remaining 
four (Northwest, Northeast, East and Southeast) with between 40 and 50 per cent.  For France as a 
whole, cereals and maize represent about 55 per cent of human consumption.  And, since as 
eleswhere these crops are the main source of urban food, one can see how it makes sense to focus 
on grain as an indicator of price movements.  Note that, as in the case of the demographic variables, 
we have calculated, from an annual price series based on the harvest year, moving averages of nine 
years.
16 
Between 1820 and 1865, nine price increases of over 10 per cent emerge.  Five of these, 
with deviations of over 20 per cent, are of a more marked character, while the remaining present 
rises of 10 to 15 per cent.  On the other hand, that of 1846, with a rise of almost 50 per cent, stands 
out - cf. Table I. If this rise is compared to that in the years of famine at the end of the seventeenth 
and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, it is seem to be very modest.  In effect, during 1693 
and 1694 the price of wheat, relative to 1688-91, rose by 147 and 228 per cent, respectively.  In the 
wake of the ‘grand hiver de 1709’ there was a rise of 285 per cent.
17 These increases are out of all 
proportion to those in Table I. Believers in a certain proportionality between harvest deficits and 
price rises must therefore concede that the crisis of 1846 is on a very minor scale compared to those 
earlier famines. 
Table I suggests that of the nine price rises, only one, that of 1854, coincides with an 
increase in the number of deaths.  Note that the crisis of 1846 does not feature in the table because 
it produced only a very minor rise in deaths,  The increase in the number of deaths of 5 per cent in 
that year does is in sharp contrast to the 50 per cent rise in the price of wheat.   
On the basis of corn yields, we have calculated deviations from a moving average.  The 
average is an approximation, since substitutions between different food crops are likely to have 
                                                 
15 Our calculation does not take account of oats and barley they were produced almost exclusive for livestock 
consumption. 
16 The prices used are those published in Labrousse, Le prix du froment en France, 1726-1913. 
17 The prices come from Baulant, ‘Le prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788’, 539-540.  8 
taken place.
18  We identify nine deficits of over ten per cent in the 1820-64 period.  In six cases, the 
percentage deficit was in the 10-20 per cent range.  In three cases, the percentage exceeded twenty 
per cent : 1853, 1861 and 1846, the last-mentioned being the biggest with 25  per cent.  Comparing 
these results with those concerning mortality opens up an important result: none of the deficits 
encountered in yields corresponds with an increase in the number of deaths. The crises occurring 
between 1820 and 1865 are therefore not subsistence crises. Setting aside those of 1832, 1849 and 
1854, which were due to cholera, they must be due to epidemics that yet remain to be identified. 
The lack of a harvest deficit effect may arise from their mild character but, as we shall see later, it 
could also be due to compensating changes in other crops. 
 
Table I : Years of demographic crisis, ‘subsistence crisis’, and high prices.
19 
  Production deficit  Price increase  Increase in deaths 
1820 12.5  Nil  Nil 
1828 Nil  11.2  Nil 
1830 15.5  Nil  Nil 
1831 10.4  13.5  Nil 
1832 Nil  Nil  12 
1834 Nil  Nil  10 
1839  Nil 16 Nil 
1846 25.1  49.9  Nil 
1849 Nil  Nil  18 
1853 22.4  22.8  Nil 
1854 Nil  11.7  17 
1855 17  27.5  Nil 
1856 Nil  21.2  Nil 
1859 Nil  Nil  13 
1861 23.2  25.3  Nil 
1863 16.3  Nil  Nil 
1864 16  Nil  Nil 
 
 
Still referring to Table I, it emerges that only five of the nine deficits coincided with a rise 
in prices: those of 1830, 1846, 1853, 1855 and 1861. Nor would there seem to be any 
proportionality between the rise in prices and the size of the harvest shortfalls.  That is particularly 
so in 1846 when the price of wheat rose by 49.9 per cent as the harvest fell by 25 per cent.   
Attempting to estimate the price elasticity relative to supply for the first half of the nineteenth 
century faces certain difficulties.  That is so for two reasons.  The first is that the historian lacks all 
the data necessary for this kind of calculation.  But, one might ask, if the historian or the economist 
cannot arrive at a clear view of  the world studies despite the sources at his disposal, then how did 
the consumer possess this universal knowledge? This leads to a second consideration, which is that 
trades multiplied while the elements that regulate price fluctuations (such as information on 
harvests and prices), are at a premium, irrational elements – rumours, panics, and other subjective 
phenomenoa – tend, as in 1846, to arbitrarily increase the price of wheat. 
These results suggest, before analysing the so-called subsistence crisis of 1846, an initial 
conclusion which would seem, at least for the period considered here, a broader significance.  It 
does not seem that one can use price rises as indicators of deficits produced by poor harvests. This 
finding also suggests care insofar as the ancien regiime is concerned, since it is quite likely that 
                                                 
18 The data on yields, area under cultivation, and production used in this paper come from the following document : 
Ministère de l'agriculture et du commerce, direction de l'agriculture, Récoltes des céréales et des pommes de terre de 
1815 à 1876, Paris, 1878. 
19 The years of scarcity have been identified from a annual average price series calculated from all départements 
between 1833 and 1860. Before and after these two dates, the average national price was based on only one third of 
départements, which would seem to bias downwards a little the percentage rise in prices.  9 
price increases then could have been the products, not of poor harvests, but of political events.  
Such events could also have been as much at the origin of a deficit in supply as high prices.
20  It 
does not follow, contrary to what Pierre Chaunu would seem to think that the baby should be 
thrown out with the bathwater.   
 
C – Substitutes and Imports. 
We have seen that wheat, meslin, and rye were not the only items destined for human 
consumption.  Depending on the region, they were supplemented by buckwheat,  maize, and the 
potato.  It is unlikely that all these crops were affected in the same way, with the result that some 
compensation between crops are likely to have occurred.  Moreover, since these three crops were 
sown in April or May, or even June in the case of  buckwheat, il was also possible that if the 
weather compromised the wheat and rye harvests, the area under these other crops was extended as 
a precautionary measure. 
Relative to the 1842-45 average, the volume of the wheat harvest fell by 19 per cent while 
that of meslin fell by 25.3 per cent and rye by 29 per cent.  The total cereal deficit came to 22 per 
cent, or a little less than indicated by the shortfall in yields. Against this, the buckwheat harvest 
rose by 29 per cent and the maize harvest by 26.5 per cent. The rise in these two items would have 
been sufficient to match the deficit in wheat and rye, were it not that the potato harvest was also a 
poor one.  In aggregate the deficit in crops destined for human food was about 17.5 per cent, so that 
in this particular case, the wheat yield was a good indicator of the variation in output.  The fact that 
the importance of buckwheat and maize across the hexagone varied considerably suggests the need 
for an geographic analysis of  regional disparities in harvest shortfalls. It also bears noting that in 
1846 the area under buckwheat rose by 4.4 percent relative to 1842-45, that of maize by 9.6 per 
cent, and that under potatoes by only 0.05 per cent.  It would seem therefore that farmers, in 
confronting the crisis that was unfolding, increased, where possible, the area under these plants.  
We need to see whether these rises occurred in those regions where the grain harvest experienced 
the greatest deficits.
21 
Apart from these substitutes and contrary to what happened later, economies at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century had another means of counteracting deficits : imports.  Did they 
exploit it during the 1846 harvest year ? That is what we are about to see.  In 1846 France imported 
4,910 million hl of wheat, either as grain or converted into flour.  In 1847 she imported 10,100 
millions and in 1848, 1,250 millions.  The administrative practice of producing import statistics for 
the calender year force us to make a few assumptions, in order to evaluate the impact of imports on 
the 1846 harvest year.   Since the 1845 harvest was an average one, we may assume that imports in 
1846 are more likely to have been concentrated towards the end of the year, in other words, during 
the 1846 harvest year.  As for imports in 1847,  given a surplus harvest that year, the demand for 
foreign wheat is likely to have fallen, as was surely the case in 1848, another good year.  The bulk 
of imports in 1847 are therefore likely to have been in response to the situation in 1846.  So as not 
to stack the cards in favour of the case we are making, we will claim only the 10,100 millions hl of 
wheat imported during 1846 for the 1846/7 harvest year. Even that reduces the wheat deficit from 
14,150 million hl to 4,150 million hl, or only 5.5 per cent of wheat consumption.  If these imports 
are included in the overall balance reached above, the deficit set at 17.3 per cent is reduced to 13.4 
per cent.  This leads us to the conclusion that there was no mortality crisis due to a lack of food in 
1846.   True, for imports to have had the impact described, they would have had to been present 
during the harvest year, and particularly during the second half of the year.  As things stand, we 
                                                 
20 The siege of Paris during the wars of religion may fit this pattern. 
21 In certain départements, still in the mid-nineteenth century, barley and oats accounted for a share, admittedly small, 
of the human diet.  It is quite likely that their share rose during scarcities.  10 
cannot be certain about this, but the tendency for prices to fall from May 1847 on makes it more 
likely.   
 
II – Was the crisis of 1847 a regional crisis ? 
Perhaps we should have ended this paper here on the basis that the mythical status of the 
crisis of 1846 would seem to be well established by now.  We continue the analysis, however, 
because it is quite likely that marked regional disparities mask through cancelling out, the existence 
of regional crises. For this reason, we move from analysis at the national level to one at a regional 
and départemental level in search of possible regional crises. The strategy adopted is the same.   
Still, at the end of the day, the analysis of the substitute crops, buckwheat, maize, and potatoes will 
be more precise, since the importance of these crops varied considerably across the hexagon.  To 
begin, we look at the extent of any mortality crises at département level. 
A – Were there regional demographic crises in 1847 ? 
In order to delimit these crises, we proceed as before.  The series at our disposal are long 
enough to generate deviations from a seven-year moving averages for every département. An 
examination of the results reveals a certain number of départements where the rise in mortality was 
in 1846 and not in 1847.  It also shows that there was a group of départements where the 
phenomenon is visible only in 1847, and others where the increases in mortality were insignificant.  
The outcome is summarised in Maps I and II below. 
Had we information on mortality trends during the 1846/7 harvest year, the results might 
have been different, particularly if the mortality in departments that stand out in the 1846 map was 
limited mainly to the second half of the calender year.  To that extent, we may have underestimated 
the size of the 1847 crisis.  However, lacking the number of deaths during the harvest year has one 
advantage.  In effect, if we were dealing with a genuine subsistence crisis, the worst of the 
mortality would have been produced at the end of the harvest year, in other words in the first half of 
1847 and not in the beginning of the harvest year (i.e. in the second half of 1846). That suggests 
two remarks.  The first is that the spread of deaths argues in favour of epidemics rather than a 
subsistence crisis.  The second is more general, and consists of a caution against reasoning based on 
annual data, be they harvest or calender years, without knowing their monthly breakdowns.   
In 1846, 28 départements out of 86 experience an excess mortality of over ten per cent, and 
ten of these it exceeded fifteen percent.  Moreover, 31 départements were above the national 
average and 56 below it. The change of geographic scale thus gives another vision of excess 
mortality, though this still remains very modest.  The identification of the départements affected by 
this excess mortality reveals an arbitrary distribution spread across French territory. There is no 
geographic coherence to it. Thus the excess mortality of fifteen percent in the Hautes-Alpes is 
isolated. If Aisne and, to a lesser extent Aube, Oise and Marne, were hit by the crisis, the Paris 
provisioning region remained untouched, which is far from characterising a real subsistence crisis.  
The Southwest was unevenly affected by the crisis.  Only the Centre seems to have been fully hit. 
All in all, these excess mortalities which, it should be remembered, were modest compared to the 
previous century, seem to have been of a local character.  One can infer that they were 
epidemiological in origin, because a subsistence crisis would have affected a bigger region - one 
supplying the major cities, for example, or one sharing the same climatic or production mix 
characteristics. In addition, if it is borne in mind that there was no cereal deficit in that year, the 
case seems closed.   
In 1847, forty of the eighty-six départements had an excess mortality of over ten per cent 
(Map II).  Of this forty, twenty exceeded the threshold of  fifteen per cent. On this occasion, fewer 
were below the national average, sixteen compared to fifty-six in 1846.  As with 1846, the change 
in scale is telling.  However, the increases in mortality were more or less the same in both years.   11 
This suggests some remarks.  We have just seen than in 1846 some départements might register 
excess mortality above ten per cent, while at national level no crisis is visible.   This finding can be 
extended to other years in this period, and even generalised.  In 1839, for instance, a year in which 
mortality was a little below trend, no fewer than eleven départements suffered an excess mortality 
of ten per cent or more, and in Seine-Inférieure a level of 29 per cent was reached. 1842 offers 
another example, when seven départements exceed ten per cent; they included Charente-inférieure 
(10.65 per cent), Lot-et-Garonne (14.8 per cent), and Somme (10 per cent). In these two years only 
epidemics are the likely culprits for such local crises. A comparison between these two years, to 
which one might add 1846 and 1847, shows that a disparity in the number of départements touched 
by this excess mortality is the only difference that concerns them, so much so that one may imagine 
that all the excess mortality in these  départements stems from local epidemics. 
In 1847, as in 1846, the geographic spread of mortality by département seems to be random 
and lack any of the geographic coherence expected from a subsistence crisis.   It would be pointless 
to give a detailed description of this spread : enough to add that the affected départements, the 
Centre region apart, are spread throughout the whole of France.  Which leads to the conclusion that 
in 1847 too, the likely cause of the crisis was local epidemics that were at best remotely linked to 
problems of subsistence.  A comparative look at local output conditions adds further insight.   
 
B – Demographic crises, price rises and harvest deficits at the regional level in 
1847. 
If the supposed increase in deaths in 1847 resulted from insufficient food, the map that 
would show this ought to bear some resemblance to that of the rise in price.   In order to verify this, 
we have calculated for harvest year 1846/7 the rise in price in each département, using a five-year 
moving average of the price of wheat.  The results are shown in Figure III. Clearly there were 
strong regional disparities.  
An examination of this graph shows that the rise in prices was very significant.  It was not 
uniform across the hexagon, however ; it ranged from 15.98 per cent to 86.94 per cent, the latter 
number reflecting a near-doubling in the price of wheat in certain départements.  In the Northeast 
about ten départements suffered, with more than 70 per cent, the biggest increases.  In another 
group of twenty départements, further to the west than the first and surrounding it, wheat rose by 
between 60 and 70 per cent. On the perimeter of this last group, the price of wheat in another 
fifteen  départements rose by 50 to 60 per cent. In the extreme west, in Brittany and coastal 
Normandy, as well as in the Southwest, it rose by between 30 and 50 per cent.  The Southwest 
experienced only a mild increase.  Overall, the price of grain in the Northwest fell relative to the 
rest of France. 
It is very difficult to establish a benchmark for a subsistence crisis, or even the existence of 
a crisis, on the basis of prices alone.  Nevertheless, a close examination of the variations in price 
shows that rises of the order of 25 to 30 per cent were not unusual during the first half of this 
century, and that such rises were not associated with subsistence crises.  That was even sometimes 
the case when the price rise was greater.  We would therefore maintain, somewhat arbitrarily, it is 
true, that in cases where the price rise of wheat was less than 50 per cent, the existence of a crisis 
was dubious at the least. In this case, if prices are used a guide, the crisis held sway north on the 
imaginary line linking Saint-Malo and Geneva, though omitting Brittany and part of Normandy. 
Comparing this map with that describing mortality, discussed above, suggests that there was 
no association between the two phenomena.  The mortality crisis therefore would seem to bear little 
relation with subsistence crises or with the peaks noted in the price series.  Thus if some 
départements in the Northeast and Centre affected by excess mortality experienced a significant 
rise in prices, others in the same zones did not.  To be sure, one might claim that there was a 
subsistence crisis in the Northeast and the epidemics were at work where no increase in the price of  12 
wheat is observed.  But this latter argument does not hold water since many départements saw 
























In Figure III we show price increases on the x-axis and changes in the death rate on the y-
axis. The horizontal cloud of dots representing the départements indicates that there is no relation 
between the two variables.  For those in doubt, the correlation coefficient of 0.05 between the two 
confirms the conclusions drawn from comparing maps and from the graph.  For the same reasons 
which were invoked at national level, we next examine the relation between the rise in deaths and 
variations in output, the variation in the wheat yield having been taken as a measure. We calulated 
the harvest deficit in each département,  using variations in the wheat yield as an index, relative to 
the average for 1843-45. The outcome is shown in Map IV. 
 
Clearly the shortfall in grain yields was unevenly distributed across the hexagon.  One 
region of big deficits is apparent in the Northeast, where a group of départements (Aisne, Meuse, 
etc.) saw a deficit of at least 30 per cent in their harvest, and some (e.g. Ardennes, Marne) where 
the deficit approachted 50 per cent.  Similar deficits are found along the Mediterranean coast and 
the Rhône corridor.  Yet, in this region, some départements were subject to a much smaller decline 
in their harvest, as in the cases of Bouches-du-Rhône and l'Isère. One also finds a zone of big 
deficits along the Atlantic coast and in the north of Brittany.  A zigzag area between these two 
areas more or less escaped the deficit, which was more pronounced in Normandie and in a region ot 
the west of Paris. 
Comparing this last map with that of excess deaths in 1847 suggests that both phenomena 
were relatively independent of each other.  In the Northeast only a few départements with a 
sizeable harvest deficit show excess mortality.  Nor does one find in the south either an exact 
correspondence between the two phenomena.  As for the most départements in central France 
which saw increased mortality, they were not subject to food crises. 
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In Figure IV the deficit in wheat yield in each département on the x-axis is plotted against 
the rise in deaths on the y-axis. Most of the resultant dots form a circle, indicating that the two 
variables are independent of each other.  The correlation coefficient of – 0.098 confirms this. 
 
The reader will not have failed to notice that the map describing harvest deficits does not 
square easily with that describing the rise in prices.   In order to see whether there is a relationship 
between the two we plotted the deficits and prices in Figure V.  There too, albeit more loosely, 
most of the points are grouped in a circle, indicating the lack of a correspondence between the two 
phenomena.  Given the correlation coefficient of –0.12 between the two, one would be hard put to 
argue that the  price rises were due to harvest shortfalls.  One therefore cannot mechanically infer a 
subsistence crisis from a high price.  This would seem to lend credence to those who reacted 
against Meuvret.  However, one may ask where the extent of the price rise matters.  A rise of two 
hundred per cent has little in commn with the rises encounted in the course of the first half of the 
nineteenth century. 
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C – Did substitutes play a bigger role at the regional level? 
Since the wheat harvest need move in line with those of other cereals (meslin, rye, and 
maize), hybrids (buckwheat), and root crops (potatoes) destined for human consumption and, in 
addition, since some of these crops can act as substitutes for cereals, an approximate measure of the 
aggregate crop deficit is desirable.  For this purpose, we have used the division into the nine zones 
used by the Ministry of Agriculture
22 (see Table II).  For all zones we have calculated the mean 
harvest for wheat, meslin, rye, buckwheat, maize, and potatoes in 1842-45.  We then calculated the 
1846 deficit as a percentage.  For aggregation purposes we converted harvests expressed in 
hectolitres into quintals.  Inevitably, this adds another element of approximation.  The results of 
these calculations are given in Table II.  
  
Tableau II : Deficits, expressed as percentages, of the harvests of different crops destined for 
human consumption, by region, in 1846. 
  Wheat  Meslin  Rye  All Cereals  Buckwheat  Maize  Potatoes   Total  
Northwest  - 19,9  - 30,5  - 37,6  - 25,7  32,7 64,5 - 53  - 26,2 
North  - 16,3  - 19,7  - 36,6  - 19,2  - 21,8  - 8,1  - 6,9  - 15,6 
Northeast  - 23,5  - 26,6  - 32,5  - 25,5  - 12,8  5,9  - 20,4  - 22,4 
West  - 20  - 25,8  - 37,8  - 25,1  28,5 15,2  - 28,9  - 24,1 
Centre  - 16,1  - 22,3  - 37,2  - 25,6  - 1,5  - 21,6  42,2 3,3 
East  - 22,4  - 36  - 24,1  - 24,4  31,8 35,9 - 42  - 29,5 
Southwest  - 5,2  -16,8  - 31,8  - 11,5  64,8 19,7  - 26,6  - 6,3 
South  - 24,9  - 20,5  - 23,1  - 23,9  19,2 47 10,4 -  4 
Southeast  - 26,2  - 50,2  - 27,8  - 12,7  12,6 5,8 - 6,8  - 10,3 
Total  - 18,9  - 25,3  - 29  - 22,1  29,2 26,5  - 18,9  - 17,4 
 
The above table shows first of all that outside the Southwest, the decficit in the wheat 
harvest, to a greater or lesser extent, affected the entire hexagon, as already indicated by the yields 
                                                 
22 In the text the zones are henceforth denoted by a capital letter, e.g. East, Centre. 
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map.  The deficit is biggest in the North and East.  The deficit in the corn harvest is by no means 
compensated by a rise in production of meslin or seigle output.  On the contrary, these two cereals 
registered declines of 25 and 29 per cent respectively in their output, declines greater than that for 
wheat.  The relative importance of meslin and rye in certain regions – whereas the wheat 
represented 70.5 per cent of the production of three cereals in the Northeast, it accounted for only 
40.5 per cent in the Centre zone – modifies the ranking of deficits.  In most cases the deficit is 
greater and sometimes by a considerable margin.  For example, the wheat deficit in the Southwest 
was 5.2 per cent, but rose to 11.5 per cent for all three cereals combined.  Only two zones don’t 
follow this pattern, South and Southwest.  At the national level, taking all three cereals into account 
increases the deficit from 18.9 to 22 per cent.   
The output of other crops reinforce considerably the inequality in deficits. Buckwheat, 
though only 6 per cent of output in France as a whole, played an important part in the Northwest, 
where it accounted for 27 per cent of output. Its place in farming was much less in other regions, 
only six per cent in the East, and barely cultivated at all in the North.  Significantly, outside the 
North and Northeast the production of buckwheat rose in 1846, sometimes by a huge factor relative 
to the reference years.  The same holds for other regions in the case of maize.  Its production also 
increased in practically all regions.  That helped, as in the Southwest, to compensate for the deficit 
in wheat, meslin, and rye, since maize accounted for about 23 per cent of production and its 
production rose by over 19 per cent. The role of the potato is more varied.  In the East, where it 
accounted for 13.6 per cent of production, the shortfall of 42 per cent in output in 1846 increased 
the overall food deficit from 24.4 per cent to 29.5 per cent. By contrast, in the Centre the potato 
helped greatly to compensate for the deficit in cereals. Thus although the cereal shortfall amounted 
to 25.6 per cent, thanks to the potato, the overall harvest was above normal.  However, unlike 
buckwheat and maize, the potato in general did not help to reduce the overall food deficit – except 
in the Central and South regions. On the contrary it amplified the shortfall.
23 Overall, the Centre, 
Southwest, South and Southeast, with a maximum deficit of 10.3 per cent and a minimum deficit of 
3.4 per cent, seem to have escaped the ‘crisis’.   The North with a loss of 15.6 per cent occupied an 
intermediate position, whereas the other four regions saw their aggregate output fall by between  
22.5 and 29.5 per cent. 
If the results in Table 2 are now compared to excess deaths in 1847 (Map II), it is apparent 
that most départements experiencing an increase in mortality were in regions where the production 
deficit was smallest.  Six of the eleven départements with a rise of over twenty per cent in deaths 
are in the Centre, where food production was 3.3 per cent above the norm  ; two are in the 
Southwest where the deficit was only 6.3 per cent; and one is in the South which suffered an output 
shortfall of four per cent.  Only two départements were located in a zone with a deficit exceeding 
twenty per cent.  If one examines next those départements where the rise in deaths was in the 15-20 
per cent range, one finds five départements out of nine where the output deficit was less than 10.5 
per cent, and therefore did not represent a real food crisis.  As for twenty départements where the 
rise in deaths was in the 10-15 per cent range, they were spread across all groups.  Another 
significant fact is that only two départements in the zone with the biggest deficit, the East, saw a 
rise in mortality, and a very weak one at that.  There is hardly any point into going into greater 
                                                 
23 In half a dozen départements in the west of France (the three Breton départements plus Ile-et-Vilaine, the 
Vendée, and Loire-Atlantique) the decline in the cultivated area under potatoes exceeded thirty per cent in 1847, and 
elsewhere in the west, south, and south-east the cultivated area also declined.  Finisterre was the only département in 
the hexagon in which the area under potatoes exceeded that under either wheat or barley in 1845.  Even given the 
considerable increase in the area under buckwheat, one might expect the failure of the potato to have caused some 
problems there.  Yet there is little sign of this in Maps I or II.  On the other hand, in several départements, particularly 
in the north and east, there was an increase in the area under potatoes between 1846 and 1847.  Such shifts were 
dwarfed by what was happening in Ireland and in the Low Countries.  Compare Ó Gráda, Black ’47, 23-24; Bourke, 
Visitation of God; Bourke and Lamb, Spread of the Potato Blight; Jacquemyns, Histoire de la crise, 254-57. 
  16 
detail in an analysis which allows us to conclude that the increase in the number of deaths cannot 




This study has allowed us to show that no genuine subsistence crisis occurred during the 
period under scrutiny, and only epidemics of a more or less national scope posed a regular threat to 
the population.  We have also seen that harvest deficits do not seem to have been severe enough to 
result in genuine food crises.  Moreover, when deficits occurred, they were uncorrelated with rises 
in mortality.  As for price rises, given that they were uncorrelated with harvests, it would seem that 
one cannot use them as a guide to variations in production.  Nor should one concentrate so 
exclusively on the wheat harvest : buckwheat, maize and the potato, as well as imports, could 
compensate for a deficit in wheat.  Finally, because it less affected by phytophthera infestans, the 
potato did not play the catastrophic role that it played in Ireland and Belgian Flanders.  All these 
changes mean that this first half of the nineteenth century marks a diametric break, as others have 
already noted, with earlier centuries and even with the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Why has 1846 become a crisis year when on the graph it exceeds the moving average by 
only a few per cent and is dwarfed by the peak that represents the cholera epidemic of 1849 ?   
Surely because, in the first place, contemporaries saw a food availability crisis in the undeniable 
rise in prices in 1846, which they linked too hastily with deaths that remained unexplained.  Surely 
also because of the over-mechanistic vision of historians for whom price rises can only mean 
crises :  ‘La mercuriale sécrète la mortalité’. Armed with this conviction, why bother scrutinising a 
mortality curve when that showing prices is its spitting image, and the price graph offers a 
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Déficit de la production du blé en 1846
(en pourcentage)